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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (2002) and as per those rules applicable to appellate assignment. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE NO, I 
Petitioner's dismissal at April 15, 2003 hearing was properly set aside and 
determined void because Judge Shumate was in compliance with Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 63 wherein a dismissal obtained in the above refenced hearing was not final. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Review of a decision to grant a new trial or open a judgment for additional 
consideration is a matter "left to the discretion of the trial judge." Whipple Plumbing v. 
Aspen Construction, 977 P.2d 518 (Utah App. 1999). The decision should only be 
reversed "if the judge has abused that discretion by acting unreasonably." Id. The 
decision to reconsider should be reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
ISSUE NO. II 
Judge Beacham's motion granting Petitioner relief from dismissal is appropriate 
because the order was not final and it therefore could be reviewed and altered. As a sua 
sponte motion, Judge Beacham's actions were appropriate because Petitioner was acting 
pro se at that point in the proceeding having terminated her previous attorney for being 
incompetent. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Review of a decision to grant a new trial or open a judgment for additional 
consideration is a matter "left to the discretion of the trial judge." Whipple Plumbing v. 
Aspen Construction, 977 P.2d 518 (Utah App. 1999). The decision should only be 
reversed "if the judge has abused that discretion by acting unreasonably." Id. 
ISSUE NO, III 
Respondent's attempt to use the doctrine of unclean hands to prevent a ruling in 
favor of Petitioner is inapplicable because there is no basis that Petitioner performed bad 
acts. Those asserted by Respondent are categorically denied by Petitioner who alleges 
they are false. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue of whether Petitioner has unclean hands should only be altered if it is 
clearly erroneous. Hone v. Hone, 95 P.3d 1221, 1222 (Utah App. 2004). The standard of 
review on this issue is clearly erroneous because any finding of unclean hands is 
grounded in fact and the trial court judge is the only party able to judge the credibility of 
the witnesses and parties to the suit. Id. Any issue of unclean hands should also be 
reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard "because a trial court is in an 'advantaged 
position' to consider equities." Id. 
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ISSUE NO. IV 
Respondent waived her right to exhume or disinter her late husband's body 
because she consented to the body's release, transport, and burial with knowledge of her 
husband's prior request for cremation. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue of waiver and whether the proper standard was used below is a legal question 
reviewed for correctness. Cedar Surgery Ctr. v. Bonelli, 96 P.3d 911, 913 (Utah 2004). 
However, the actions and events supporting the determination are factual and should be 
reviewed as such giving deference to the trial court. Id. 
ISSUE NO, V 
Respondent also waived her right to exhume or disinter her former husband based 
on Utah case law. Petitioner has met her burden under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
65A(e) which determines elements needed for an injunction. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue of waiver and whether the proper standard was used below is a legal question 
reviewed for correctness. Cedar Surgery Ctr. v. BonellU 96 P.3d 911, 913 (Utah 2004). 
However, the actions and events supporting the determination are factual and should be 
reviewed as such giving deference to the trial court. Id. 
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ISSUE NO. VI 
The Trial court used facts that are not in dispute when it granted summary 
judgment in favor of the Petitioner. No material facts are in dispute. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review on summary judgement is one of correctness because it is a 
question of law. Dowling v. Bullen, 94 P.3d 915, 917 (Utah 2004). Here the court must 
determine "whether the undisputed facts support the trial court's conclusion." Lack v. 
Deseret Bank, 746 P.2d 802 (Utah 1987). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Code of Judicial Conduct. Cannon 3(E)(1). 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (2002). 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 58A( c). 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 63. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 63(a). 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 63(b). 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 63(b)(2). 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65A(e). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I NATURE OF THE CASE 
On February 12, 2002, Curtis Hughes left a telephone message for Ihe Respondent 
in which he stated that he intended to commit suicide. (R990) H also requested that his 
ashes be spread over the Rio Grande River. (R990). Respondent did not tell anyone 
about the call from Curtis threatening suicide and indicating his wish to be cremated. 
(R1200 at 96-97). Approximately fifteen days later, on Febmary 27, 2002, Curtis Hughes 
died of apparent suicide. (R990; T1200 at 34). Funeral sendees were held in New 
Mexico on March 5, 2002 and in St. George, Utah on March 8,2002. (T1200 at 35). 
Respondent made funeral arrangements in New Mexico, released the body for travel to St. 
George, Utah, and attended the funeral and burial in St. George. (Rl 196 at 121:8; T1200 
at 35). 
Following Curtis Hughes death, a note was left addressed to his mother (the 
Petitioner and Appellee in this action) containing salutations and some general 
instructions. (R990). 
Petitioner was informed of and given the suicide note following her son's death. 
However, stricken with grief Petitioner delayed reading the note until after the March 5, 
2002 New Mexico funeral service. (T1200 at 36). In fact, Petitioner did not actually read 
the note until the day she departed for Utah to take part in the St. George funeral on 
5 
March 6,2002. (T1200 at 36). She read the note for the first time in a gas station parking 
lot preparing to depart for St. George. (T1200 at 36). 
Having read the note, Petitioner felt strongly that the contents were important for 
Curtis' widow to see. Petitioner delayed her return to Utah in order to notify Respondent 
regarding the contents of the note. (T1200 at 37). Petitioner reversed direction, turned 
her car around, and immediately sought out the Respondent. (T1200 at 39). In the 
presence of others, Petitioner gave the note to Respondent and observed her reading the 
note. (T1200 at 40-41). After reading it, the Respondent responded with seeming 
surprise. (Rl 196 at 121:1-13). In her deposition, Respondent acknowledged that she in 
actuality had read the note. In regards to the contents therein, Respondent said "Oh, my 
God he didn't want a funeral. We've just had one and I've agreed to let you have one." 
(Rl 196 at 121:8). Interestingly, Respondent later doubts the authenticity of the note, 
claiming that it may have been altered. (Rl 196 at 123-24). 
Almost a year after Curtis Hughes burial, on November 1, 2002, Respondent 
decided she wished to have his body exhumed and cremated. After discovering 
Respondent's intent, Petitioner filed a Temporary Restraining Order in to block the 
Respondent's actions, as she had a dramatically different view of the appropriateness of 
the proposed disinterment. (R398). 
A hearing was scheduled for April 15, 2003 in order to hear argument on whether 
to make the restraining order permanent. (R105-106). The April 15, 2003 hearing was 
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originally requested by Respondent on December 23, 2002 but was continued from that 
date. (R78-79). The hearing was continued to its April 15, 2003 date by stipulation on 
March 13, 2003. (R100-01). 
On April 14, 2003, Petitioner's attorney, William L. Bernard, filed a motion to 
recuse Judge Shumate and an affidavit supporting that motion. (R155-16 & 117-20). 
Petitioner appeared at the April 15, 2003 hearing, yet Respondent and her counsel were 
not present. (R130). Respondent alleges that Petitioner did not provide any notice of 
the motion to recuse. (R140). Respondent's counsel mistaikenly thought the hearing had 
been cancelled. (R140). Respondent's attorney stated his only legal duly on the day of 
the hearing was to "advise and console my client that despite her frustration, in light of 
Petitioner's Motion to Recuse, there could be no hearing that day." (R140). 
Respondent's assumption was mistaken, however, and the hearing took place. (R130). 
Petitioner and Judge Shumate were surprised that Respondent and her attorney were not 
present. (R194 A:208-09). 
After a short discussion with Judge Shumate, Petitioner's attorney dismissed the 
recusal motion and the hearing was allowed to go forward on the merits. (R130). 
Petitioner's counsel then drafted what he understood represented the order of the court. 
(R131-35). The orders were filed, and signed on April 16, 2003. (R131-35). 
Judge Shumate was interested in fairness and stated that his "job is to make sure 
that everything is absolutely fair and even." (R209). Upon examination of the orders 
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filed by Petitioner's attorney, there was some confusion regarding whether the orders 
executed and filed were in keeping with the intent of the judge's ruling from the bench. 
(R399). Respondent filed a Motion and Memorandum to Alter or Amend Judgment. 
(Rl94-252). In response to the motion to alter the order, Judge Shumate, apparently still 
interested in fairness as stated supra, on his own motion recused himself. (R400). 
Judge Shumate stated that the proceeding had become filled with "missteps and 
misunderstandings." (R398). He also stated that there had been a "general failure to 
comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules of Judicial Administration." 
(R399). Judge Shumate appropriately made reference to the recusal motion made by 
Petitioner on April 14, 2003 and determined that in order to comply with Rule 63 of Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, that the "proper course of action is to have the case transferred 
to another judge to be heard..." (R400). Judge Shumate further stated in reference to the 
confusion that took place following the April 14, 2003 motion to recuse that "any action 
taken...is invalid. (R400). 
The case was then transferred to Judge Beacham for the issues to be heard, and 
considered outside of the atmosphere of confusion. (R400). 
II. DISPOSITION AT THE DISTRICT COURT 
After the case was assigned to him, Judge Beacham, heard arguments on 
competing summary judgement motions. (R988). He entered judgment in favor of 
Petitioner. (R988). Petitioner's Permanent Injunction prevented and forbade Respondent 
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from disinterring her husband, son of the Petitioner. (R985). Judge Beacham granted 
Petitioner's Permanent Injunction because, "Respondent's motion for summary judgment 
lack[ed] a sufficient factual basis." (R989). Additionally, after considering the legal 
issues, Judge Beacham determined that Respondent knew of Curtis' wish to be cremated 
and by allowing the body to be buried had waived her right to "choose another form of 
disposition." (R394-95). In fact, Judge Beacham determined that whether or not 
Respondent had seen the note left to Petitioner prior to burial was immaterial stating that 
"Mr. Hughes informed Respondent of his wish to be cremaled before his death, and 
Respondent, in apparent good faith, either chose not to believe him or chose not to 
comply with his wishes." Id. The court found that "Respondent could have chosen to 
have the body cremated in accordance with the wishes Mr. Hughes once expressed to 
her." (R995). 
After the Permanent Injunction was entered on behalf of the Petitioner, 
Respondent filed a Motion to Compel Settlement Agreement. (Rl 148). Respondent 
argued that the court should enforce an agreement that was "allegedly made between the 
parties' counsel" prior to the filing and hearing of the Petitioner and Respondent's 
Summary Judgment Motion. (Rl 149). Respondent's motion was denied when the court 
was unpersuaded that an enforceable agreement was reached and the permanent 
injunction remained. (Rl 152). Respondent filed an appeal with this court on December 
12, 2003. 
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III. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Curtis Hughes and Respondent married on March 18, 2001. (Tl 196 at 15). 
During their 11 month marriage, communication was poor, conflict persistent, and a veil 
of secrecy was prevalent. (T1196 at 21-27, 30, 32, 36-38, 58, 60-61, 69, 73-75, 78-86). 
Some close to Curtis speculated that he had a gambling problem. (Tl 196 at 21-27). 
Respondent was unsure as to whether this was true. (Tl 196 at 21-27). As part of the 
marital discord, Respondent changed the locks on the marital home. (Tl 196 at 69-70). 
Respondent also abandoned the marital home for short periods of time due to alleged 
safety concerns. (Tl 196 at 82-83). Curtis and Respondent were separated from February 
13, 2002 through February 15, 2002. (T1200 at 109). 
On February 12, 2002, Curtis threatened suicide. (R990). That night, Curtis called 
Respondent and informed her that he was going to take his life and indicated at that time 
that he wished to be cremated and have his ashes spread over the Rio Grande river. 
(R990). On February 27, 2003 Curtis Hughes took his own life. (R397). Prior to taking 
his life, Curtis crafted two letters and left them for his mother and his brother Steve. 
(Tl 195 at 14: 13-23). Petitioner gained possession of the letter left to her by her deceased 
son when she arrived in New Mexico for Curtis' funeral service (the funeral service that 
Respondent arranged and executed). (Rl 195 at 19:8). 
At the time of the New Mexico funeral service, Petitioner was unaware of the 
letter's contents. (Rl 195 at 19:8). Petitioner was also unaware of the contents of the note 
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left her by her son during the initial communications with Respondent immediately 
following Curtis' death. (R1195 at 17-19). Upon reading the note, she immediately 
located the Respondent and shared the contents with her. (Rl 195 at 22:15). 
Curtis' New Mexico funeral service was conducted on March 5, 2002 at the 
direction of Respondent. (T1200 at 35). No objection was made to the arrangements 
made by Respondent. (R991). Respondent made no attempts to cremate her late 
husband's body when she had full unequivocal control, along with the ability to do so. 
(R991). 
Following the New Mexico service, the body was released with the consent of the 
Respondent and shipped to St. George, Utah where a second funeral was held. (T1200 at 
35). Respondent attended the funeral in St. George. (Rl 195 at 58:10-19). Respondent 
participated in the program by requesting the addition of a poem. (Rl 198 at A24). 
Respondent participated in the burial at the cemetery. (Rl 198 at A22-23). And, 
Respondent expressed happiness and satisfaction that Curtis would have his final resting 
place close to his family. (Rl 195 at 20:13-15). All acts indicated that Curtis was buried 
with the Respondent's complete consent and blessing. 
Curtis was loved by his family. In fact, in the months prior to Curtis's suicide, 
relationships were positive and he had been in contact with his family. (Rl 195 at 11-12; 
Rl 196 at 13-14, 49, 50). Curtis' brother Steven had a particularly close relationship wilh 
him and they saw each other often. (Rl 196 at 49-50). Steven and Curtis shared 
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warehouse space owned by Curtis. (Rl 196 at 95,112). Petitioner knew about Curtis and 
his important life events. (Rl 195 at 37-38, 94-95). This, despite the fact that Curtis was 
discouraged in his relationships with his family by Respondent. (Rl 195 at 37-38, 94-95). 
Petitioner was also in contact with Curtis. (Rl 196 at 49-50). In fact she had seen Holly, 
her granddaughter, on recent occasions. (Rl 196 at 49-50). Petitioner made continuous 
efforts to secure and maintain a relationship with her son. (Rl 195 at 11-12). Those 
efforts were seemingly successful as Curtis chose to communicate with his mother upon 
his death. Respt.'s App. Br. Al (Aug. 12, 2004). Evidence of the close relationship that 
Curtis had with the Petitioner is clear from the suicide note he left her. Respt.'s App. Br. 
Al (Aug. 12, 2004). The fact the fact that Curtis made his mother the beneficiary of his 
life insurance policy and not Respondent also indicates a close relationship. (Rl 196 at 
44). 
Upon discovering the contents of the note, Petitioner felt that the interests of the 
family, including the interests of the Respondent and Curtis' daughter, would be better 
served if her son's body was not cremated. (Rl 195 at 25-26). Petitioner also felt that her 
son, who had entrusted her with the apparent authority to dispose of his estate, would be 
satisfied with her decision. (Rl 195 27-28). Curtis was therefore buried in St. George, 
Utah. 
Nearly eight months after the burial of Curtis Hughes, Respondent attempted to 
have Curtis' body exhumed for cremation. (R397). Despite the fact her attempts were 
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inconsistent with Utah law, Respondent was determined to disturb the final resting place 
of the late Curtis Hughes. (R397). When Petitioner realized that Respondent was taking 
such action, she filed for temporary relief, a hearing was scheduled, and litigation began. 
As stated supra, Petitioner was granted summary judgement against Respondent and 
granted a permanent injunction on November 14, 2003. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
ISSUE NO, I 
Judges are give a specific directive by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 63 to followr 
when a motion to recuse has been filed. The dismissal given by Judge Shumate as part of 
the April 15, 2003 hearing was properly dismissed and declared invalid because the 
dismissal was not final and Judge Shumate was bringing the proceedings back into 
conformity with the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
ISSUE NO, II 
Judges are given discretion to reconsider rulings and instructed to give pro se 
parties "every consideration that may reasonably be indulged." Lundahl v. Quinn, 67 
P.3d 1000, 1001-02 (Utah 2003). Judge Beacham's conduct was also within his 
discretion because judges are permitted to review decisions before they are final. Utah R. 
Civ. P. 63(a). 
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ISSUE NO, III 
Respondent's issuance of allegations against Petitioner are careless. Respondent 
makes repeated claims that Petitioner has committed bad acts, however, the events are 
disputed, immaterial to the decision rendered and the result of poor lawyering that was 
remedied as soon as was practical by the Petitioner. 
ISSUE NO, IV 
Respondent knew of the decedent's wishes to be cremated based on a phone call 
that was made to Respondent's home. Because she knew of the decedent's wish and 
allowed the body to be transported to St. George for a funeral that she took part in, 
Respondent has waived her right to now determine disposition of the body. 
ISSUE NO, V 
Respondent has also waived her right to exhume or disinter the decedent's body 
based on case law. Smart v. Moyer, 577 P.2d 108 (Utah 1978). Moyer establishes the 
standard for waiver in exhumation and disinterment cases and shows that Respondent not 
only waived her right to cremate the deceased, but that she does not have a compelling 
reason to disinter 
ISSUE NO, VI 
Summary judgment may only be granted when there is no issue of material fact disputed. 
Latch v. Deseret Bank, 746 P.2d 802 (Utah 1987). In the case at hand, the lower court 
found for the Petitioner with facts that were not material and were also undisputed. 
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Additional facts, referred to by Respondent, are unimportant and immaterial to the 
determination of summary judgement. 
ARGUMENTS 
ISSUE NO, I 
DISMISSAL WAS PROPERLY SET ASIDE AND DETERMINED VOID 
BECAUSE JUDGE WAS CONFORMING TO UTAH RULE OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 63 AND DISMISSAL WAS NOT FINAL 
A. Dismissal Was Properly Set Aside By Judge Shumate And Was in 
Conformance With Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 63 
Judges are directed specifically by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 63 as to the 
procedure they must follow when a motion to recuse or disqualify has been filed 
regarding their participation in a legal matter. Under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
63(b)(2) a judge has two narrow options he/she may follow when a motion to recuse has 
been filed. First, a judge may, without hearing, enter an order that simply grants the 
motion and thereby recuses themself. Utah R. Civ. P. 63(b)(2). Alternatively, a judge 
may, without hearing, certify the motion and refer it to a presiding judge in that court. Id. 
Options are limited. 
Some Utah case law suggest that even an insincere filing of a recusal motion 
indicates that a judge should not hear the case, despite the actual presence or lack of bias, 
because the mere filing of the recusal motion may cause a judge to "unconsciously lean 
toward such [a] litigant to demonstrate that he is not biased toward him." Haslam v. 
Morrison, 190 P.2d 520, 524 (Utah 1948). That court goes on to say there is a risk a 
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judge may not be entirely free from emotion in the situation where a recusal motion has 
been filed against him/her. Id. The Utah Supreme Court also states that it may be better 
for a judge to merely recuse themself even where there is no bias to prevent suspicion 
based on the integrity and fairness of that judge. State v. Byington, 200P.2d 723, 395 
(Utah 1948) overruled in part on other grounds, 684 P.2d 1257. 
The requirements of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 63(b) are made even more clear 
looking at Barnard v. Murphy. 882 P.2d 679 (Utah App. 1994). In Barnard, the court 
shows once again that the appropriate way for a judge to deal with a motion to recuse is to 
follow the dictates of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 63(b). Id. at 682. Barnard outlines 
that the court has merely two options and states that "such action must be taken even if 
there is only minimal judicial action remaining to be done in the case." Id. at 682. 
In her brief, Respondent argues repeatedly that the oral dismissal issued by Judge 
Shumate from the bench amounts to the final dismissal of Petitioner's claim. Respondent 
gives no weight however to the fact that the order was not final, it was against petitioners 
will, and it was given as part of a proceeding that was filled with missteps and confusion. 
Respt.'s App. Br. 21-27 (Aug. 12, 2004). In this matter, Respondent is trying to take 
advantage of this confusion hoping it may work to her advantage. 
However, exercising judicial discretion, Judge Shumate took appropriate action to 
bring the confused proceeding back into conformation with the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Originally, Judge Shumate failed to undertake one of the authorized courses 
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of action after Petitioner filed the motion to recuse. Eventually, Judge Shumate 
determined the appropriate course of action was to recuse himself and send the case to 
another judge. 
Respondent contributed to the confusion of this proceeding by not showing up to 
the hearing scheduled for April 15,2003. Respondent's counsel points out that Petitioner 
mailed the motion to recuse "so that ordinarily I, as Respondent's counsel, would not 
have even received the same until days after the scheduled hearing [emphasis original]" 
(R140). No explanation is ever given for why Respondenl thought the April 15, 2003 
hearing was cancelled. Respondent was aware of the hearing, made the original request 
for the hearing, and stipulated to its April 15, date. If Respondent did not receive notice 
of the recusal motion, certainly they should have been there in any case as a result of their 
own noticed hearing. Their absence increased the confusion, therefore, Respondent 
contributed to the confusion that led Judge Shumate to call it a "confused proceeding" 
and ultimately determine that he should recuse. 
Upon notification that a motion had been filed to recuse Judge Shumate, the proper 
course of action would have been to either immediately recuse himself or refer the case to 
the presiding judge to determine if Judge Shumate could hear the case without bias. 
However, Judge Shumate proceeded with a scheduled hearing, in the absence of 
Respondent and her counsel; confusion abounded. Ultimately, Judge Shumate's actions 
brought this matter into conformity with the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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Respondent also relies heavily on Stebbins v. White, a California case which 
argues that once a party has withdrawn their motion to recuse, any decision by a judge is 
voidable, not void. Stebbins v. White, 235 Cal. Rptr. 656 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987). Although 
reliance on Stebbins is unnecessary because the proper procedure is set forth in Utah Rule 
of Civil Procedure 63, Stebbins is a poor fit for the current situation and potentially 
misleads the court. Specifically, Respondent argues that Petitioner led the court into error 
and therefore cannot claim relief from that error. Respt.'s App. Br. 22 (Aug. 12, 2004). 
In Stebbins, the Respondent moved for recusal and later withdrew that same 
motion and allowed the case to proceed through final judgment. Stebbins v. White, 235 
Cal. Rptr. 656 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987). Later, after losing the same party tried to repudiate 
the recusal withdrawal by claiming their earlier attempt was irrevokable. Stebbins at 665. 
Stebbins is dramatically different than the case at hand. First, Petitioner has never 
tried to repudiate her recusal request. The request was withdrawn and after the confused 
hearing of April 15, 2003, Petitioner filed as an order what was thought to represent the 
intent of the ruling of the court. Petitioner clearly has never attempted to repudiate her 
recusal motion. 
Second, unlike Stebbins, where the Respondent, unhappy with the outcome of the 
proceeding, attempts to revisit their motion from which they had attempted to withdraw 
earlier in the trial. Petitioner in the case at hand is in no way trying to take advantage of 
her former motion. Petitioner is pleased with the way that the case was ultimately dealt 
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with. She is disappointed that there was such confusion, however, she is not seeking 
relief from error. She is merely requesting that Judge Beacham's decision granting her a 
permanent injunction baring the disinterment of her son be upheld. 
Another difference between Stebbins and this case is that while the acts of the 
disqualified judge are voidable in Stebbins, not void, they are such because the 
Respondent consented to the acts of the court and appeared to be preserving some secret 
objection if the case did not work out the way planned. Stebbins at 782. In the instant 
case, the acts of Judge Shumate are void because the court determined them such, not 
because the Petitioner was secretly preserving an objection or trying to revive her recusal. 
Id. 
Judge Shumate's actions are also proper under the Code of Judicial Conduct. 
Cannon 3 which indicates that a judge shall perform the duties of the office with 
impartiality and dignity. Id. Cannon 3(E)(1) indicates that a judge may recuse or 
disqualify when impartiality may be questioned. Id. 
Judge Shumate properly exercised judicial discretion when he ruled that orders 
granting permanent injunction were invalid and recused himself from the proceedings. 
B. Dismissal Was Properly Set Aside Because Order Was Not Final 
An order or judgment is valid and complete for all purposes when it is signed and 
filed With the court. Utah R. Civ. P. 58A( c). Additionally, "an unsigned minute entry 
does not constitute a final judgment/' Wisden v. City ofSalina, 969 P.2d 1205 (Utah 
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1985); Wilson v. Manning, 645 P.2d 655 (Utah 1982). Trial courts also have discretion 
and the ability to reconsider and change their positions with respect to orders or decisions 
they render as long as those decisions are not final, meaning they are signed and filed. 
Brookside Mobile Home Park Ltd V. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, ^ [18. In fact, even oral 
statements that are inconsistent with the findings of the court do not affect the final 
judgment. McCollum v. Clothier, 121 Utah 311 (Utah 1952). Judges have the discretion 
to reassess and make corrections if done so before a decision is formally rendered and 
thus final. Utah R. Civ. P. 58A( c). 
Respondent claims that the oral order of dismissal given by Judge Shumate was 
valid and enforceable and should therefore be entered and made final. Respt.'s App. Br. 
17,24. Respondent also argues that the oral order given by Judge Shumate should 
control, thereby allowing Respondent to take advantage of the missteps and confusion 
pervading during that portion of the proceedings. Respt.'s App. Br. 24-25. 
Respondent's arguments are flawed. Due to the manner in which the case was 
handled at the April 15, 2003 hearing, Judge Shumate determined that the appropriate 
course of action would be to follow procedure set forth in Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and recuse himself. This action was well within Judge Shumate's power and discretion. 
Respondent's position is not with Utah law defining the power of the court. Having 
responded to Petitioner's attorney and dismissing the case that was before it, then having 
signed a permanent injunction the court stated that the events were fraught with "missteps 
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and misunderstandings/' and deemed the appropriate action to be recusal and allow 
another judge to take a fresh look at the case. (R398-400). 
Ultimately, the oral dismissal granted from the bench by Judge Shumate, if 
entered, could have become the final order of the court. Unfortunately, confusion 
pervaded and incorrect orders were signed by Judge Shumate. Discovering the error, 
Judge Shumate determined that the best course of action was to act according to the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure and recuse himself and at the same time declare the actions 
taking place after the recusal motion invalid. Judge Shumate's actions were not only 
legally valid, they were well within his discretion. 
ISSUE NO, II 
GRANTING PETITIONER RELIEF FROM DISMISSAL IS 
APPROPRIATE BECAUSE ORDER COULD BE REVIEWED AND 
PETITIONER WAS ACTING PRO SE 
A. Order May be Reviewed 
The sua sponte motion by Judge Beacham granting Petitioner relief from the 
erroneously obtained order is appropriate because the order was not final and could be 
reviewed by the court. Rule 63(a) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is clear that after 
disqualification of a judge "[t]he judge to whom the case is assigned may in the exercise 
of discretion rehear the evidence or some part of it." Utah R. Civ. P. 63(a). 
As mentioned in section 1(B) supra, orders are final when they are signed and filed 
with the court. Utah R. Civ. P. 58A( c). Utah case law indicates that judges may 
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reconsider orders and other rulings before they are final. Hall v. Utah St. Dept. Of 
Corrections, 24 P.3d 958, 962 (Utah 2001); Ron Shepherd Ins,, Inc. V. Shields, 882 P.2d 
650, 654 (Utah 1994). 
In Ron Shepherd Ins. an order granting summary judgement for the defendant was 
orally entered yet not signed. Ron Shepherd Ins., Inc. at 652. Shortly thereafter, the 
plaintiff filed a "Motion for Reconsideration," claiming that new information had become 
available. Id. Defendants filed a memorandum in opposition to plaintiffs motion. 
However, before defendant's motion could be considered, plaintiffs moved for recusal of 
the judge. Id. Following the procedure for recusal, the judge in the action recused herself 
in order to avoid "even the appearance of impropriety." Id. The initial order for summary 
judgement which had been granted but not signed hung in the balance and upon further 
reconsideration by the new judge, plaintiffs "Motion for Reconsideration" was denied 
and the judge entered final judgement for defendants. Id. On appeal, plaintiffs 
challenged the bench ruling, at which time the court said, "an unsigned minute entry does 
not constitute an entry of judgement nor is it a final judgment for purposes of appeal." Id. 
at 653. The court goes on to say that the initial order was not signed, it "is not a final 
order" and therefore could not be considered on appeal. Id. 
In Ron Shepherd Ins., because the order was not final the court on appeal stated 
that "a trial court is free to reassess its decision at any point prior to entry of a final order 
or judgement." Ron Shepherd Ins., Inc. at 654. 
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In the case at hand, where the Respondent claims the oral order is final, it was not, 
because it was never correctly signed and entered. It can be seen in a minute entry, 
however, the order did not comply with the oral order that was signed. Upon realizing 
that the order was not correct, Respondent moved to take advantage of the missteps and 
tried to make the oral order final by filing a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. 
Respondent was unsuccessful because Judge Shumate recused himself. 
On further consideration, Judge Beacham determined that the oral order was not 
appropriate and he withdrew the oral order. Judge Beacham's actions were lawful and 
appropriate because the order was obtained erroneously, was not the wish of the 
Petitioner, and was the product of legal negligence by Petitioner's counsel. Perhaps most 
importantly, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 63(a) allows for this kind of review. 
Respondent kindly reports in their brief that Judge Beacham dismissed the oral 
order because it was "mistaken" and "based on improper procedure," yet does not report 
that Judge Beacham goes on to say: 
[T]he idea that a petitioner's attorney can dismiss the petitioner's attorneys case by 
mistake also offends me, and I don't think it is just. 
I think it would be unjust for the merits, whatever they may be, to be avoided - to 
be avoided on the basis of Mr. Bernard's apparent confusion. (Tl 199 at 44-45). 
Judge Beacham goes on to say that allowing dismissal in such a manner would: 
...multiply litigation by giving - giving the petitioner a clear case against her 
attorney, and there's no great thing to be gained by that... (Tl 199 at 45). 
23 
Here, Judge Becham had concerns about the prior proceeding and determined that 
it was better to dismiss the oral order than to rely on a record that was part of a confused 
proceeding, and full of missteps. 
B. Petitioner Was Acting Pro Se When Judge Beacham Sua Sponte 
Granted Petitioner Relief From Dismissal 
The sua sponte motion by Judge Beacham granting Petitioner from the erroneously 
obtained order is appropriate because when the motion was made as Petitioner was acting 
pro se, having fired her attorney due to his ineptness. Utah courts have consistently held 
that pro se litigants will be held to a high standard when they represent themselves, 
however, Utah courts have stated clearly that a non lawyer representing themselves 
"should be accorded every consideration that may reasonably be indulged." Lundahl v. 
Quinn, 67 P.3d 1000, 1001-02 (Utah 2003) citing Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 
1213 (Utah 1983). 
Judge Beacham correctly made the determination to sua sponte grant relief from 
the oral dismissal because Petitioner was acting pro se at that point in the proceeding. 
Additionally, it was clear from the record that Petitioner did not intend to dismiss the case 
at the April 15, 2003 hearing. This was easily discerned by Judge Beacham. 
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ISSUE NO, III 
DOCTRINE OF UNCLEAN HANDS IS INAPPLICABLE BECAUSE 
PETITIONER IS NOT GUILTY OF BAD ACTS 
The doctrine of unclean hands, correctly applied, stands for the proposition that if 
a party seeks an equitable remedy, they must come to the court having not violated 
principles of equity. Hone v. Hone, 95 P.3d 1221, 1223 (Utah App. 2004). Essentially, if 
a party is guilty of bad acts, they may be denied the requested remedy "when fairness and 
good conscience so demand." Id. On appeal, the doctrine of unclean hands is preserved 
by arguing the principle in pleadings or as an issue at trial. Meyer v. Deluke, 457 P.2d 
966, 969 (Utah 1969). 
Respondent argues that a court of equity cannot help a party with unclean hands. 
Respt.'s App. Br. at 33. Respondent also characterizes events taking place throughout Ihe 
proceedings as suspect and deceitful. Respt.'s App. Br. 35. Petitioner takes issue with 
these characterizations and submits that if indeed she were guilty of bad acts, she would 
be barred from relief, however, she is not. 
Respondent's outline of the events which took place prior to burial wrongly 
suggests that Petitioner's desire to bury her son despite the contents of the suicide note 
means she has unclean hands and make her ineligible for relief. Respt.'s App. Br. 34-35. 
Respondent's reliance on these facts to argue that Petitioner has unclean hands is 
misplaced. Choosing to bury her son does not automatically define Petitioner as having 
unclean hands in relation to this action. 
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Respondent also claims that Petitioner deceived the Respondent by not showing 
her the suicide note. However, Petitioner was under no obligation to show the note to 
Respondent. The note was left to Petitioner, gave instruction to Petitioner, and made no 
request for the Petitioner to share the note with Respondent. In any case, Petitioner had 
not read the note until after the New Mexico funeral service. When she did read the note, 
she immediately found Respondent and showed her the note. Respondent acknowledged 
in her own deposition that she read parts of the note. Specifically, she expressed shock 
upon reading that Curtis did not want a funeral. 
Even after reading the note, Respondent allowed the body to be released and she 
even attended the Utah funeral. Any attempt to suggest that not showing the note to 
Respondent gives the Petitioner unclean hands is tenuous and denies undisputed facts of 
this case. 
Other attempts are made to show that the Petitioner has unclean hands by 
suggesting that her counsel played "legal hardball," filed orders that were intentionally 
not representative of the courts instruction, and intentionally tried to deceive the court. 
Petitioner was also unhappy with the services of her counsel, William Bernard. 
Without legal expertise and understanding, she trusted him to represent her appropriately. 
She was disappointed with that service, and ultimately terminated him. She represented 
herself briefly before securing new counsel. Additionally, while the court found that 
Petitioner's counsel played "legal hardball," they also found that it was a confused 
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proceeding where incorrect orders were signed. The court then made the determination 
that the proper course of action was to void their actions, recuse, and send the case to 
another judge that could hear arguments and rule on the issues of the case. 
Petitioner does not have unclean hands and should not be barred from any 
equitable remedy. 
ISSUE NO. IV 
RESPONDENT WAIVED HER RIGHT TO EXHUME OR DISINTER THE 
DECEDENT'S BODY BECAUSE DECEDENT MADE WISH TO BE 
CREMATED KNOWN TO RESPONDENT PRIOR TO HIS DEATH 
Waiver involves the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Jensen v. IHC 
Hospitals, 82 P.3d 1076, 1094 (Utah 2003). Specifically, there are three elements to 
waiver. Id. First, there must be a right, benefit, or advantage. Id. Second, there must be 
a knowledge of the right's existence. Id. Lastly, there must be an intention to relinquish 
that right which may be determined by looking at facts or looking at the totality of the 
circumstances and making an inference. Id.; IHC Health Services, Inc. V.D&K 
Management, Inc., 13 P.3d 320 (Utah 2003); U.S. Realty 86 Associates v. Security 
Investment, Ltd., 40 P.3d 586, 589 (Utah 2002); Pasker v. Morse, 887 P.2d 872, 876 
(Utah App. 1994). 
In Smart v. Moyer, the court specifically addressed the issue of waiver when 
dealing with exhumation cases. Smart v. Moyer, 577 P.2d 108,111 (Utah 1978). The 
court found that when a body had been buried, the party whose initial right it was to 
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determine disposition of the deceased had waived their right to further determine the fate 
of the corpse. Id. Essentially, because the party had failed to act, the party with the 
original right to determine disposition waived their right and could not impact the status 
of the corpse. Id. In Moyer, the executor had the right to determine the disposition of the 
deceased, the executor had a knowledge of that right, and the court found upon 
examination of the facts and the totality of the circumstances, that the trustee intentionally 
waived that right by virtue of the fact that the deceased was buried. Smart v. Moyer, 577 
P.2d 108 (Utah 1978). 
In Pasker, the defendant Morse, retained the services of an architectural services 
firm to design a building. Pasker v. Morse, 887 P.2d 872 (Utah App. 1994). As part of 
the contract with the architectural firm, several stop gaps existed that served to 1) limit 
the work done without pay, and 2) stated an obligation to pay based on work done. Id. at 
874. As the project progressed, the architectural firm continued to work at the request of 
Morse. Id. When the firm did not get paid and they sued for the balance, Morse claimed 
protection stating that the architectural firm had waived the provision protecting them by 
proceeding with work when the contract indicated they would cease unless paid. Id. 
Ultimately in Pasker, the court found intent waiver by looking at the "totality of the 
circumstances" and making an "inference." Id. at 876. Morse had waived his protection 
under the contract by requesting and accepting continued work on his project. 
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In the case at hand, Respondent had a right as Curtis' spouse to determine the 
disposition of his body. This right is uncontested as part of the proceeding. Respondent 
also knew of that right. An intention to relinquish that right may be inferred based on the 
circumstances and is supported by both Moyer and Pasker. 
Like Pasker, where the court looked at the totality of the circumstances to find the 
needed intent for waiver to have taken place, here it is easy to find facts that evidence 
waiver. Specifically, and consistent with Moyer, the Respondent allowed the body of her 
late husband to be buried. She also participated in the preparations and ceremonies 
associated with that burial. 
ISSUE NO, V 
RESPONDENT WAIVED HER RIGHT TO EXHUME OR DISINTER THE 
DECEDENT'S BODY AND PETITIONER HAS MET HER BURDEN 
UNDER 65A(e) 
A, Case Law Supports Ruling that Respondent Waived Her Right to 
Exhume or Disinter 
Common law and Utah law regarding exhumation could not be more clear and 
supportive of Judge Beacham's ultimate ruling to disallow exhumation of Curtis Hughes 
body. Silver King Coalition Mines Co. V. Industrial Commission established that the 
rights of a party existing prior to burial do not remain after burial. 1204 P.2d 811, 813 
(Utah 1949). Yet the definitive case on exhumation is Smart v. Moyer, 577 P.2d 108 
(Utah 1978). 
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In Moyer, the court clearly states that once a person is buried, they should not be 
exhumed "except for the most compelling of reasons." Moyer at 111-12. Additionally, 
while Respondent is given the right to make decisions regarding her husbands burial by 
virtue of the fact that they were married at the time of death, Moyer establishes that if the 
right is not exercised it may be waived. Id. at 112. 
Respondent claims that Moyer does not apply, yet fails to distinguish the case in 
any way or do anything more than to say that the facts of the "Moyer case hardly 
compare" to the case at hand. Respt's App. Br. 41. Contrary to the Respondent's claims, 
Moyer does apply, and it establishes the standard by which exhumation is governed. 
In Moyer the issue was identical to the case at hand; can an individual with the 
initial right to determine the disposition of a deceased party exhume, having not exercised 
that right prior to burial? In Moyer, Thomas Moyer died and his will, which was properly 
executed, indicated that he wished to be cremated. Moyer at 109. Despite his written 
directive his mother and family buried him in the Salt Lake City Cemetery. Id. In Moyer, 
like the case at hand, both parties have a "diametric" view of the facts that proceeded 
burial, yet, the court finds that the critical fact of the utmost importance is that the body of 
Thomas Moyer was buried without objection. Id. Based on the fact that Thomas Moyer 
had been laid to rest, the court found that the party trying to exhume post burial had failed 
to act and therefore "waived any right conferred...to direct the disposal of the deceased's 
remains." 7^ /. at 111. Then, as if to underline the point, the court states that "he [Thomas 
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Moyer] should remain buried where he is." Id. Because of the "reverent regard for the 
remains of their loved ones, especially of children for their parents and parents for their 
children...it is therefore a sound and well-established policy of the law that a person, once 
buried, should not be exhumed except for the most compelling of reasons." Moyer at 
110-11. 
Like Moyer, where an individual had a legal right to determine the disposition of a 
body and did not exercise that right, Respondent had the ability, opportunity, and right to 
determine the disposition of Curtis Hughes. Like Moyer, where the parties had 
"diametric" views of the events that took place prior to burial, in this case the parties 
cannot agree on what took place prior to burial. Like Moyer, where the party with the 
right to determine disposition of the body knew of the deceased's wish to be cremated and 
did not act, Respondent knew that Curtis asked to be cremated based on his February 12, 
2002 phone call. Like Moyer, where the party with knowledge allowed the body to be 
buried, thereby waiving the right to determine further disposition of the deceased, in the 
case at hand, Curtis Hughes was sent to St. George by the Respondent, had a second 
funeral in which Respondent participated, and like Moyer, Curtis Hughes was buried in 
St. George. Any claim that the case at hand is unlike Moyer or attempt to dismiss their 
similarity is disingenuous, and clearly denies the facts of both Moyer and the case 
currently contested. 
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One fact does distinguish Moyer from the case at hand. In Moyer, the parties were 
relying on a legally executed will, so unlike Moyer, in the case at hand there are only a 
phone call and a partially typed note. Neither the phone call nor the note are a legally 
binding. This fact and distinguishing factor only strengthens Petitioner's case. Certainly 
if burial constituted waiver in Moyer despite a legally binding will, waiver exists where 
the document relied on by Respondent is not legally binding and its authenticity is even 
criticized by the Respondent. 
Respondent knew of the deceased's wish to be cremated and had the power as his 
spouse to make that happen. However, she participated in funeral plans, held a funeral in 
New Mexico, allowed the body to be transported to St. George, took part in the St. 
George funeral service, contributed to the program there, stood next to the grave site as it 
was dedicated. She took pictures and mourned with members of the family, and watched 
her husband lowered into the ground. Under Moyer, she has waived her right to have 
Curtis cremated. 
Judge Beacham also did not allow Respondent to bootstrap provisions of the 
Funeral Services Licensing Act, because the act only establishes the order of priority used 
to determine who may determine the method of disposition. ( R 995). The priority or 
order of those who are able to determine disposition of Curtis Hughes' body is not a 
contested issue. The contested issue in this case is whether an individual may disinter a 
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body having knowledge of a wish to be cremated yet the person has already having been 
laid to rest. 
B. Petitioner Meets Her Burden Under Rule 65A(e) 
A party seeking to obtain an injunction must meet four specific criteria. Utah R. 
Civ. P. 65A(e). A party must show that they will suffer irreparable harm if the order is 
not given. Id. The party seeking the injunction must also show that the injury that would 
be suffered but for the injunction outweighs any damage potentially incurred by the 
enjoined party. Id. Additionally, the party must show that the injunction would not be 
adverse to public policy and that there is a substantial likelihood that the applicant will 
prevail if the matter were tried. Id. Petitioner meets each of these burdens. 
Petitioner would be tremendously harmed if the injunction was dismissed. She 
loves her son and if his burial were to be disturbed it would cause irreparable emotional 
harm. Cremation would violate Petitioner's custom and religious values in addition to 
opening an old wound. The grave represents closure for the Petitioner and it has been 
dedicated as the her son's final resting place. Other members of the family would also 
suffer great harm if Curtis body was exhumed. Petitioner and her family visit the grave 
site, they care for it, and it stands as an important monument and reminder of their son 
and their relationship with him. 
The injury that Petitioner would suffer if the injunction were set aside is far greater 
than that of the Respondent. Respondent merely wishes to grant the wish of her deceased 
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husband. If her desire is merely to grant the wish of her husband, her individual interest 
is di minumus and pales when compared to that of the Petitioner and Curtis9 extended 
family. Respondent may also claim benefits from having the grave site for her deceased 
husband. Respondent can visit the grave, mourn there and remember her husband there. 
Respondent's damage is comparatively minimal. 
The order for injunction would not offend any public interest. Because Curtis 
Hughes' body is currently buried, which is the traditional U.S. culture, and because it 
would require no additional action by the civic government, no public interest is offended 
by maintaining the injunction. Moyer in fact states that because of the revered place 
society places on a persons remains that it is sound policy for the body to remain buried 
once laid to rest. Smart v. Moyer, 511 P.2d 108, 111-12 (Utah 1978). Interestingly, it is 
more likely that a public interest would be damaged if the injunction were set aside. Any 
attempt to spread the ashes of Curtis Hughes over the Rio Grande would be in direct 
violation of a New Mexico. New Mexico Administrative Code 20.6.2.7(MM) (stating 
that ashes and other refuse may not be placed in New Mexico ground and surface water). 
Lastly, the order for injunction if fully litigated would certainly be granted. Law 
dictates that a corpse once laid to rest should remain unless there is a particularly 
compelling reason to exhume. Id. While much may be said about the facts leading up to 
the burial of Cutis, the fact remains that regardless of whether the Respondent knew of 
the contents of the note, once the body has been laid to rest it should remain. Moyer at 
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111-12. A note that merely confirms the Respondent's knowledge of her deceased 
husbands wishes does not constitute a change in circumstances or a compelling reason to 
exhume. Ironically, the note prompting the change of heart for the Respondent has been 
attacked as inauthentic and altered by the Respondent herself. (Rl 196:123-24). 
ISSUE NO, VI 
TRIAL COURT USED UNDISPUTED FACTS, ACCEPTED BY 
RESPONDENT, WHEN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
A moving party may seek summary judgement at any time 20 days from filing or 
service of summary judgement by the other party. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary 
judgement will be granted where there is no "genuine issue as to any material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Id. at ©. Case law clearly 
supports this proposition as well. On appeal, the court must "[determine whether the 
undisputed facts support the trial court's conclusion." Lack v. Deseret Bank, 746 P.2d 
802, 804 (Utah App. 1987). 
Clearly it is the duty of the court hearing the summeiry judgement motion to 
consider all the evidence with a reasonable inference in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. 
However, if the issues of material fact are not disputed, the court may rule, particularly 
when it is "clear from the undisputed facts that the opposing party cannot prevail." Id. 
citingFrisbee v.K&KConst. Co., 676 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 1984); Snyder v. Merkley, 
693 P.2d 64, 65 (Utah 1984). Said another way, "a motion for summary judgment should 
be denied where the evidence presents a genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved 
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in favor of the nonmoving party, would entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law." 
Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982). In order for a summary judgment to 
be denied, any fact that is material to the decision must be contested. In the case between 
Petitioner and Respondent, the judge was able to determine the outcome, without any 
question as to a material fact and as a matter of law. (R989). 
Judge Beacham ruled on the cross summary judgment motions stating that the 
factual disputes in "Respondent's memorandum...consist mainly of argument and 
immaterial facts and are not sufficient to raise any particular genuine issue of material 
fact." Id. Respondent argues again that she was not fully aware of her deceased 
husband's wishes, an argument that is contrary to evidence, and then claims that Judge 
Beacham was not in a position to determine material fact because he had not taken 
testimony. Respt.'s App. Br. 42-43 (Aug. 12, 2004). This argument is inconclusive, open 
ended and contrary to the workings of summary judgment. 
Judge Beacham found that the facts needed to rule as a matter of law for Petitioner 
were not only present, but undisputed. For instance, Judge Beacham considered that 
Curtis left a voice mail message for Respondent on February 12, 2002 indicating that he 
was going to commit suicide, a fact that is undisputed between the parties. (R990). 
Similarly, Judge Beacham found that Respondent hired French's Mortuary who under 
Respondent's instruction prepared Curtis body for burial. (R991). Most importantly, 
Judge Beacham found that the February 12, 2002 telephone call which undisputed 
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constituted notice of Curtis Hughes' wish to be cremated and that the note left to 
Petitioner was merely "another expressions of [his] wishes." (R 994). 
Despite claims by Respondent that Judge Beacham elevated the relationship of 
mother and her son over that of husband and wife, Judge Beacham did not consider these 
as facts. The mere fact that he speaks of the importance of the relationship between 
mother and her son does not obfuscate that Respondent knew of her husband's wishes 
and did nothing to execute them until he was laid to rest in St. George. 
CONCLUSION 
When Curtis Hughes apparently committed suicide his spouse, the Respondent, 
prepared his body for burial, released the body for transport to St. George, Utah for 
another funeral in that location, attended the funeral in Utah, and watched her husband's 
coffin placed in the ground. She did this with the knowledge that on February 12, 2002 
he told her he wished to be cremated. 
Almost eight months later, she changed her mind and attempted to exhume her 
husband's body. This was troubling to Curtis Hughes' mother. When she gained 
knowledge of the Respondent's actions, she petitioned the court for an injunction. 
Petitioner was granted a preliminary injunction and later a permanent injunction. 
A permanent injunction was given by Judge Beacham after troubled and 
sometimes confused proceedings. The first Judge, Judge Shumate, recused himself and 
rendered his actions invalid. Judge Beacham, heard motions, considered the issues in the 
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case and based on incontrovertible facts, granted Petitioner's wish and ordered a 
permanent injunction. Petitioner/Appellee requests that the summary judgement rendered 
by Judge G. Rand Beacham as well as the Permanent Injunction preventing disinterment 
of her son be upheld, and that she be awarded the attorney's fees associated with having 
to defend this appeal. 
DATED this / ^ * day of October, 2004. 
The Law Offices of Kathleen McConkie 
KATHLEEN McCONKIE' 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellee 
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